IEC 62443: Threat Modeling an IACS Conduit — A Worked STRIDE Example

Date
2027-01-25
Location
Online
Host
Zach L

About this event

A live 30-minute expert session on Threat Modeling an IACS Conduit — A Worked STRIDE Example (IEC 62443 — Industrial Cybersecurity). What We'll Cover: Where conduit-level threat modeling sits inside the 62443-3-2 detailed risk assessment and the 4-1 SR practice The worked example step by step: DFD of the conduit, STRIDE per element, scoring, mitigation selection tied to SL-T How identified threats map to specific SRs and the threat model report and mitigation backlog produced Common mistakes: modeling the whole plant at once, threats without an access vector, mitigations never fed back into requirements The traceability an assessor checks: each high-rated threat closed by a requirement, countermeasure or accepted risk Related topics: threat modeling · stride · data flow diagram · conduit t

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About Functional Safety Foundations

This online session delivers expert-led instruction on the regulatory landscape and implementation approach for Functional Safety Foundations.

The cross-sector fundamentals underlying every functional safety standard: risk as severity × likelihood, the safety function concept, integrity levels, the safety lifecycle, and the split between random and systematic failures.

What it regulates

Shared vocabulary and reasoning: hazard → risk → risk reduction allocation → safety requirement → verified implementation → maintained integrity in operation.

Who must comply

Everyone entering the field — the conceptual base of the entire catalog.

Key requirements of Functional Safety Foundations

  • Hazard and risk fundamentals
  • Safety function anatomy: sensor-logic-actuator with defined safe state
  • Integrity ladders (SIL/PL/ASIL/DAL) as risk-reduction currencies
  • Random vs systematic failure treatment
  • Lifecycle and management of functional safety incl. competence

Key concepts: Functional Safety Foundations

Functional safety management
Planning, competence, documentation and assessment wrapped around technical work.
Random vs systematic
Hardware wear-out/chance failures quantified statistically versus design/process errors controlled by rigor.
Risk reduction allocation
Distributing required risk reduction among mechanical design, safeguards, control functions and procedures.
Safe state
The defined condition a function drives the equipment to on demand or fault.

Frequently asked questions: Functional Safety Foundations

Why can't testing alone prove safety?

Rare-event targets (like 1e-7/h) are unverifiable by test duration, and systematic errors evade random testing — hence the standards' dual machinery of quantified hardware analysis plus process rigor and independent assessment.

Standard information based on the published text of Functional Safety Foundations. Event content is provided by the host. For authoritative guidance, consult the official standard body.