Functional Safety Certification for Space Robots and Manipulators: ARP4761 Explained

Date
2026-09-24
Location
Online
Host
Zach L

About this event

An Advanced Practitioner Session for Cross-Functional Product Teams pursuing functional safety certification. A live 30-minute advanced practitioner session on ARP4761 (Aircraft Safety Assessment) for space robots and manipulators, built for cross-functional product teams pursuing functional safety certification. What We'll Cover: What ARP4761 (Aircraft Safety Assessment) requires and how its scope applies to space robots and manipulators Mapping ARP4761 clauses to the certification evidence assessors expect System-specific hazards and safety functions typical of space robots and manipulators Common findings that delay certification, and how to avoid them A practical readiness roadmap for cross-functional product teams preparing for assessment Related topics: ARP4761 · Space Robots and Man

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About ARP4761 (Aircraft Safety Assessment)

This event covers the compliance, engineering, and verification requirements defined by ARP4761.

ARP4761 defines the civil aircraft safety assessment process and methods: FHA, PSSA, SSA with supporting analyses (FTA, FMEA, CCA including zonal, particular risk, common mode) demonstrating certification safety objectives.

What it regulates

Failure condition identification and classification (catastrophic to no effect), probability objectives per class (e.g., catastrophic ≤1e-9 per flight hour with no single failure), and the derivation of design/assurance requirements.

Who must comply

Safety departments of airframers and major system suppliers feeding certification (CS/FAR 25.1309 et al.).

Key requirements of ARP4761

  • FHA at aircraft/system level classifying failure conditions
  • PSSA allocating qualitative/quantitative requirements downward
  • SSA verifying the implemented design meets objectives
  • Common cause analyses: zonal, particular risks, common mode

Key concepts: ARP4761

1e-9 rule
The canonical catastrophic-condition quantitative objective per flight hour, combined with no-single-failure criteria.
CCA
The trio of analyses defeating shared-cause optimism in redundant architectures.
Failure condition classes
Catastrophic/hazardous/major/minor/no-effect driving both probability targets and DALs.

Frequently asked questions: ARP4761

How do ARP4761 outputs shape software work?

Failure-condition classes set item DALs, which set DO-178C objective sets; derived safety requirements (monitors, partitioning, independence) become explicit software/hardware requirements verified under those regimes.

Standard information based on the published text of ARP4761 (Aircraft Safety Assessment). Event content is provided by the host. For authoritative guidance, consult the official standard body.